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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

This action was filed to halt a non-judicial foreclosure instituted by Homecomings
Financial, LLC ("Homecomings") through and with Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,
Inc. ("MERS") and Executive Trustee Services, Inc. ("ETS"). Gregory Renshaw ("Appellant")
sought to stop the foreclosure sale of his home; sought a decree that Homecomings, MERS, and
ETS have no substantive rights in Appellant's Promissory Note ("Note") or Deed of Trust
("DOT"); and sought damages.
This action was brought pursuant to Section 22 of Appellant's DOT entitled
Acceleration, which provides the following:
"The notice shall further inform Borrower of ... the right to bring a
court action to assert the non-existence of a default or any other
defense of Borrower to acceleration and sale." (emphasis added)
Appellant challenges MERS' substantive right to foreclose his Loan ("Loan" refers to the
Appellant's Note and DOT). Additionally, MERS has failed to abide by the procedure required
by the Idaho Trust Deeds Act prior to commencing the foreclosure sale of Appellant's home.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW.

Appellant filed his Complaint on December 6, 2010. R., p. 15. The trustee's sale of
Appellant's home was scheduled for December 29, 2010. R., p. 22,

~

48. The trustee's sale was

cancelled. Appellant filed his First Amended Complaint on February 15, 2011. R., p. 123.
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On August 3, 2011 the trial court issued its Memorandwn Decision and Order on
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment. R., p. 261. In its Memorandum
Decision, the trial court dismissed the majority of Appellant's causes of action.
Following this ruling and the bankruptcy filings of Homecomings and ETS, Appellant's
surviving claims against MERS are the following: (1) negligence in commencing the foreclosure
sale of Appellant's home and (2) violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act in commencing
the foreclosure sale of Appellant's home
Appellant's Expert Witness Disclosure was made on March 12, 2012.

R., p. 275.

Appellant's disclosed the following as his experts:
1. Richard Kahn, Foreclosure Fraud Examiner. R., p. 276.
2. Dr. Michael McMartin, Appellant's treating physician. R., p. 276
3. Heidi Emery, Title examiner. R., p. 276.
Appellant filed his First Request for Judicial Notice on March 16, 2012. R., p. 449.
On March 21, 2012 Homecomings, MERS, and ETS filed their Motion for Summary
Judgment. R., p. 1015.
Appellant filed his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on April 11, 2012.

R., p.

1193.
On April 20, 2012, Appellant filed his Second Request for Judicial Notice (R., p. 1417),
which included the following evidence:
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Request No. 20: Exhibit 111, written transcript of Video Deposition of R.
K. Arnold taken on September 25, 2009 in the case Henderson v.
MERSCORP, INC, et al, Case No. CV 08-900805.00 in the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County, Alabama.
Appellant filed his Rebuttal Expert Witness Disclosure of Richard Eppink on May 10,
2012. R., pp. 1710-1722.
On May 16, 2012, Appellant filed Notice of Bankruptcy Filing, which notified the trial
court that Homecomings and ETS had filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy relief, requested
Homecomings and ETS verify their bankruptcy filing, and notified the trial court that Appellant
intended to proceed with the scheduled jury trial solely against MERS. R., p. 1746.
The jury trial of this case was to commence on July 10, 2012.
On May 25, 2012 Appellant filed his Third Request for Judicial Notice (R., p. 1748) and
his Notice oflntent to Offer Defendants' Admissions at Trial. R., p. 1797.
On June 8, 2012 MERS' attorneys moved to Withdraw as Counsel for MERS. R., p. 11.
On June 13, 2012, the trial court denied MERS' motions to strike Appellant's experts.
Tr., p. 85, !. 4 - l. 14. The trial court granted counsel's motion to withdraw and vacated the jury
trial on June 22, 2012. R., pp. 2022-2023.
On July 23, 2012 the trial court entered its Decision and Order re: Summary Judgment
granting MERS summary judgment and denying Appellant his Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. R., p. 2025. Appellant filed his Motion for Reconsideration on August 6, 2012. R.,
p. 2035.
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On October 16, 2012, the trial court entered its Decision and Order re: Motion for
Reconsideration, which denied Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration (R., p. 3389) and entered
its final Judgment. R., p. 3394.
Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on November 27, 2012 (R., p. 3396) followed by his
Amended Notice of Appeal on November 28, 2012. R., p. 3408.
C.

ST A TEMENT OF FACTS.

The facts are set forth in Appellant's Amended Complaint, Homecomings, MERS and
ETS' Answer, MERS' admissions, multiple discovery responses of the parties, depositions,
expert reports, affidavits filed in support and in opposition to the summary judgment motions
and in Appellant's First, Second, and Third Requests for Judicial Notice, all part of the Record in
this appeal. The Clerk's Record consists of 3,424 pages. As the trial judge stated, "[t]here are a
number of factual assertions by both sides which are hotly disputed .... "
The trial court's Decision and Order re: Summary Judgment states the pertinent facts as
follows:
The plaintiffs loan was secured by a Deed of Trust on his property
at 3480 South Pimmit Place in Boise, Idaho which listed Homecomings
Financial, LLC as the lender, Pioneer Title as the Trnstee, and MERS as
the beneficiary under the Deed of Trust. The Deed of Trust specifically
provides that MERS, as nominee for the lender and its "successors and
assigns" has the right to foreclose and sell the property and to take any
action that the lender was entitled to take. The Deed of Trust makes
repeated reference to MERS and the fact that it is the beneficiary of the
Deed. It also clearly indicates that the loan server may be changed and
that the note or interests in it can be sold without prior notice to the
borrower. The plaintiff signed the Deed of Trust on June 27, 2007. The
Deed of Trust was recorded on July 3, 2007. The plaintiff failed to make
his May, 2010 loan payment and has failed to make any payments since
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then. (footnote deleted) In August 2010, the plaintiff was served with a
Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust by Pioneer
Title Company as the trustee "in favor of 'MERS' MORTGAGE
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. SOLELY AS
NOMINEE FOR HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL, LLC
as
Beneficiary." The Notice states that MERS was the current holder of the
beneficiary interest in the Deed of Trust. It asserts a default in the
monthly payment beginning May 1, 2010. A Trustee's Sale was scheduled
for December 29, 2010. A Debt Validation Notice apparently sent
concurrently with the Notice of Default and Election to Sell advised the
plaintiff of the amount of the delinquency and gave him thirty days to
dispute the validity of the debt and listed the "current creditor" as
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. The plaintiffs home was
not sold in the trustee sale.
In August, 2010, the plaintiff applied to GMAC to refinance his
loan. He did not qualify because his income was insufficient. In March,
2012, he again applied for a loan modification. He did not qualify for a
Home Affordable Modification Program ("HAMP") loan because of his
income level.
It is not disputed that Homecomings Financial LLC. transferred its
interest in the note to Residential Funding LLC, a related company. The
note is currently held by GMAC Mortgage LLC. In November, 2007,
Residential Funding LLC. sold the beneficial interest on the loan to
Freddie Mac which is a member of MERS. GMAC is the servicer on the
loan and is a member of MERS. The plaintiff was notified that GMAC
was the servicer on the loan in June, 2009. Payments on the mortgage
were processed by GMAC from July 1, 2009 until the plaintiff failed to
make his May, 2010 payment. No mortgage payments have been made
since that time. The trustee's sale did not go forward.
The plaintiff, in his Amended Complaint, challenged the authority
of MERS to commence a non-judicial foreclosure and the failure of the
various mortgage entities involved to follow the requirements of Idaho's
trust deed statutes, including recording requirements. The Amended
Complaint also challenges MERS power to act in the deed of trust
foreclosure proceedings. Most of the causes of action asserted in the
Amended Complaint are raised against other defendants. The plaintiff
asserts causes of action against MERS for negligence, tortious interference
with contract, wrongful foreclosure, slander of title, fraud, unjust
enrichment, and consumer protection act violations. Judge Williamson,
who had previously been the judge assigned to this case, dismissed the
cause of action for Tortious Interference with Contract with respect to
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MERS as well as the causes of action for fraud, slander of title and unjust
enrichment. There are a number of factual assertions by both sides which
are hotly disputed but the focus, in all motions for summary judgment, is
whether there are any genuine, material issues of fact which are in dispute.
There are no issues of material fact in dispute.

R. pp. 2025- 2028, Decision and Order re: Summary Judgment, July 23,
2012,
The following material facts are also included in the Record:
On August 11, 2010 (prior to filing this lawsuit) Appellant first applied for a Horne
Affordable Loan Modification. R., pp. 1235-1246. Two days later, Appellant was served with
(1) Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust (R., p. 130) and (2) Notice of
Trustee's Sale (R., p. 130).
The following facts are uncontroverted by reason of the Defendants' admissions in their
pleadings and in their responses to Requests for Admission. For ease of reference an Excerpt of
these pleading and discovery responses are set forth in the Appendix which is found in the
Clerk's Record at pp. 1797-1819.
a.

Homecomings, MERS, and ETS had scheduled a foreclosure sale of
Appellant's home for December 29, 2010 at 1:00 p.m. R., pp. 186-187.

b.

On October 15, 2010 Appellant, by a Qualified Written Request (QWR),
requested the current holder of the Note and the current holder of the DOT
be identified and that the scheduled foreclosure sale be cancelled. R., pp.
189-204.
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c.

On November 11, 2010 Appellant, again by a QWR, requested that certain
docmnents be produced and that the scheduled foreclosure be cancelled.
R., pp. 206-207.

d.

Homecomings is not the current holder of Appellant's Note.

e.

Homecomings is not in possession of Appellant's Note.

f.

Homecomings is not the current beneficiary of Appellant's DOT.

g.

Homecomings transferred its interest in Appellant's Note and its Interest
in Appellant's DOT.

h.

Homecomings does not represent and is not the agent of the current holder
of Appellant's DOT.

1.

Homecomings' has no interest in Appellant's Note or Appellant's DOT it
seeks to foreclose.

J.

MERS has no financial interest in Appellant's Note.

k.

MERS does not represent the current holder of Appellant's Note.

1.

Appellant's DOT names Pioneer Title Company of Ada County as trustee.

m.

ETS is not the trustee of the DOT.

n.

ETS does not purport to be the trustee of the DOT.

o.

ETS is the attorney-in-fact for Pioneer Title Company of Ada Cotmty.

p.

ETS prepared and delivered to Appellant:
I.

Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust (R., pp.
71-72);
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IL

Notice of Trustee's Sale (R., pp. 73-74); and

111.

Debt Validation Notice (R., p. 75).

r.

Only authorized persons or entities may foreclose the Deed of Trust.

s.

No sale, transfer or assignment of Plaintiffs Deed of Trust has been
recorded in Ada County, Idaho.

t.

Homecomings and ETS are subsidiaries of GMAC Mortgage, LLC.

Appellant's loan has been securitized or sold on the secondary market. Tr., p. 45, ll. 1314. R., pp. 304-306
The beneficial interest in Appellant's loan was transferred to Freddie Mac on November
9, 2007. R., pp. 306-307, 1247. Freddie Mac requires the properly endorsed original note and
properly assigned DOT original be held by the document custodian in every Residential
Mortgage Backed Security. R., p. 307.
Multiple endorsements and transfers of Appellant's Note are found in the Record at pp.
1248-1249. All endorsements are undated, are made without recourse, and are made between
subsidiaries of GMAC Mortgage, LLC.
MERS Rule 8 requires a recorded Assignment from MERS to the last lender prior to
commencing foreclosure. R., pp. 1322-1326.
MERS Rule 8 requires that this foreclosure proceeding be done in the lender's name and
not in MERS's name. R., pp. 1322-1326.
MERS documentation has been robo-signed. R., pp. 316-317.
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Appellant made a second application for a Home Affordable Loan Modification on
December 11, 2011. R., p. 1235-1246.
Appellant is entitled to a Home Affordable Loan Modification of no more than 31 % debt
to income ration or $435 per month. R., p. 314.

II.
ISSUES ON APPEAL

I.

Is Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. a lawful "beneficiary" within the

terms of Idaho's Trust Deed Act?
2.

Does the transfer of Appellant's Note from the lender to a successor result in an

automatic assignment of the DOT that must be recorded prior to the commencement of nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings under Idaho Code§ 45-1505(1)?
3.

What is the legal effect of MERS acting as an unlawful beneficiary under the terms of

Idaho's Deed of Trust Act?
4.

What cause of action does Appellant possess against MERS?

5.

Is Appellant entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs as the result of this appeal?

III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The mere fact that both Appellant and MERS moved for summary judgment in the trial
court does not establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Appellant's motion must
be evaluated on its own merits, its own facts, and its own legal theories.
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In lntermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 31P.3d921
(2001 ), the Idaho Supreme Court held that where the parties have filed cross-motions for
summary judgment relying on the same facts, issues and theories, the parties effectively stipulate
that there is no genuine issue of material fact that would preclude the district court from entering
summary judgment; however, the mere fact that both parties move for summary judgment
does not in and of itself establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact.

When

parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment the applicable standard of review does
not change, and the Supreme Court must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits. See,

McFadden v. Sein, 139 Idaho 921, 88 P.3d 740 (2004) for the same propositions.
If the case is to be tried by the court without a jury, where cross-motions for summary

judgment are filed, based upon the same evidentiary facts and upon the same theories and issues,
the parties effectively have stipulated that no genuine issues of material fact exist (emphasis
added). Zollinger v. Carrol, 137 Idaho 397, 399, 49 P.3d 402, 404 (2002) (citing Riverside

Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 518 n. 1, 650 P.2d 657, 660 n. 1 (1982)).
But such is not the case here. This case was to be tried before a jury and Appellant's
facts and legal theories are not the same as those advanced by MERS. See also, E. Idaho Agr.

Credit Ass'n v. Neibaur, 130 Idaho 623, 626, 944 P.2d 1386, 1389 (1997); First Sec. Bank of
Idaho, NA. v. Murphy, 131Idaho787, 790, 964 P.2d 654, 657 (1998).
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IV.
APPLICABLE LAW

MERS is a recent invention of the mortgage industry unrecognized by traditional
mortgage law that, as its own documents prove, has no role in the lending process. Instead, it
acts as a privatized county recorder's office that neither the borrower, the public nor the courts
can access. MERS' efforts to use forms and legal sleight of hand to manufacture an interest in
Appellant's DOT have no basis in fact or law.
As Judge Meyers, Chief U.S. Bankruptcy Judge for the District ofldaho stated:
... [c]hanges in mortgage practices over the past several years have created
a number of new issues.... Serial assignments of the mortgagee's
interest(s) and the securitization of mortgages have complicated what was
previously a generally straight-forward standing analysis.
In re Sheridan, 2009 WL 631355 (Bkrtcy D. Idaho 2009).

The Idaho Trust Deed Act (Idaho Code § 45-1502 through § 45-1515) provides
definitions for three and only three parties to a deed of trust. Idaho deed of trust law provides
statutory definitions around which the roles and rights of the three parties have developed. First,
"'Beneficiary' means the person named or otherwise designated in a trust deed as the person for
whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his successor in interest, and who shall not be the trustee."
Idaho Code§ 45-1502(1). Second, '"Grantor' means the person conveying real property by a
trust deed as security for the performance of an obligation." Idaho Code § 45-1502(2). Third,
"'Trustee' means a person to whom the legal title to real property is conveyed by trust deed, or
his successor in interest." Idaho Code§ 45-1502(4).
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Prior to Trotter v. Bank of New York Mellon, et al, 275 P.3d 857 (Idaho 2012), certain
issues presented in this case had not been addressed by an Idaho Appellate Court. Trotter, a pro

se litigant, in both the District Court and Idaho Supreme Court asserted the following:
1. Before a party may make use of the procedural requirements under the Deed
of Trust Act, it must demonstrate its substantive right to use them.
2. That his promissory note had been securitized thus eliminating the possibility
of default on his part.
3. That a trustee is required to prove it has standing.
4. Under Idaho law MERS could not assign its interest in his deed of trust.
Based upon the Record in Trotter (which did not include Trotter's deed of trust and did

not include any evidence of securitization and did not include any legal precedent) the Idaho
Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's grant of Summary Judgment to Defendants.
The pro se homeowner in Trotter failed to provide the District Court with any facts or
authority that supported his legal theories.
Unlike Trotter, based upon this Record, it is undisputed that MERS has no interest in
Appellant's Note or DOT and that MERS has no substantive, contractual or statutory authority to
foreclose on Appellant's home. See, R., pp. 1387-1391 for factual and legal distinction between
this case and Trotter.
In order to understand what MERS is and what it is not, it is helpful to first examine the
structure of MERS.

The Washington Supreme Court, in the case of Bain v. Metropolitan

Mortgage Group, Inc., No. 86206-1(August16, 2012) described MERS as follows:
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MERS, now a Delaware corporation, was established in the mid 1990s by
a consortium of public and private entities that included the Mortgage
Bankers Association of America, the Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(Freddie Mac), the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie
Mae), the American Bankers Association, and the American Land Title
Association, among many others. See, In re MERSCORP, Inc. v.
Romaine, 8 N.Y.3d 90, 96 n. 2, 861 N.E.2d 91, 828 N.Y.S.2d 266 (2006);
Phyllis K. Slesinger & Daniel McLaughlin, Mortgage Electronic
Registration System, 31 Idaho L. Rev. 805, 807 (1995); Christopher L.
Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage
Electronic Registration System, 78 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1359, 1361 (2010). It
established "a central, electronic registry for tracking mortgage rights
... [where p]arties will be able to access the central registry (on a need to
know basis.)" Slesinger & McLaughlin, supra, at 806. This was intended
to reduce the costs, increase the efficiency, and facilitate the securitization
of mortgages and thus increase liquidity. Peterson, supra, at 1361. As the
New York high court described the process:
The initial MERS mortgage is recorded in the County
Clerk's office with Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc." named as the lender's nominee or mortgagee
of record on the instrument. During the lifetime of the
mortgage, the beneficial ownership interest or servicing
rights may be transferred among MERS members (MERS
assignments), but these assignments are not publically
recorded; instead they are tracked electronically in MERS's
private system.

Romaine, 8 N.Y.3d at 96, 828 N.Y.S.2d 266, 861 N.E.2d 81. MERS
"tracks transfers of servicing rights and beneficial ownership interests in
mortgage loans by using a permanent 18-digit number called the Mortgage
Identification Number." Resp. Br. of MERS at 13 (Bain) (footnote
omitted). It facilitates secondary markets in mortgage debt and servicing
rights, without the traditional costs of recording transactions with the local
county records offices. Slesinger & McLaughlin, supra, at 808; In re
Agard, 444 B.R. 231, 247 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011)
Many loans have been pooled into securitization trusts where they,
hopefully, produce income for investors. See, e.g. Pub. Emps' Ret. Sys. Of
Miss. V Merrill Lynch & Co., 277 F.R.D. 97, 102-03 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
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(discussing process of pooling mortgages into asset backed securities).
MERS has helped overcome what had come to be seen as a drawback of
the traditional mortgage financing model: lack of liquidity. MERS has
facilitated securitization of mortgages bringing more money into the home
mortgage market. With the assistance of MERS, large numbers of
mortgages may be pooled together as a single asset to serve a security for
creative financial instruments tailored to different investors. Some
investors may buy the right to interest payments only, other principal only;
different investors may want to buy interest in the pool for different
durations. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Azize, 965 So.2d 15 l,
154 n. 3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Dustin A. Zacks, Standing in Our Own
Sunshine: Reconsidering Standing, Transparency, and Accuracy in
Foreclosures, 29 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 551, 570-71 (2011); Chana JoffeWalt & David Kestenbaum, Before Toxie was Toxic, Nat'l Pub. Radio
(September 17, 2010, 12:00 AM.) (discussing formation of mortgage
backed securities). In response to the changes in the industries, some
states have explicitly authorized lenders' nominees to act on lenders'
behalf. See., Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys, Inc., 770 N.W.2d
487, 491 (Minn. 2009) (noting Minn. State.§ 507.413 is "frequently called
'the MERS statute'). As of now, our state has not.
As MERS itself acknowledges, its system changes "a traditional three
party deed of trust [into] a four party deed of trust, wherein MERS would
act as the contractually agreed upon beneficiary for the lender and its
successors and assigns." MERS Resp. Br. At 20 (Bain). As recently as
2004, learned commentators William Stoebuck and John Weaver could
confidently write that "[a] general axiom of mortgage law is that
obligation and mortgage cannot be split, meaning that the person who can
foreclose the mortgage must be the one to whom the obligation is due."
18 Stoebuck & Weaver, supra, § 18.18, at 334. MERS challenges that
general axiom. Since then, as the New York bankruptcy court observed
recently:
In the most common residential lending scenario, there are
two parties to a real property mortgage-a mortgagee, i.e.,
a lender, and a mortgagor, i.e. a borrower. With some
nuances and allowances for the needs of modern finance
this model has been followed for hundreds of years. The
MERS business plan, as envisioned and implemented by
lenders and others involved in what has become known as
the mortgage finance industry, is based in large part on
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amending this traditional model and introducing a third
party into the equation. MERS is, in fact, neither a
borrower nor a lender, but rather purports to be both
"mortgagee of record" and a "nominee" for the mortgagee.
MERS was created to alleviate problems created by, what
was determined by the financial community to be, slow,
burdensome recording processes adopted by virtually every
state and locality. In effect the MERS system was designed
to circumvent these procedures. MERS, as envisioned by
its originators, operates as a replacement for our traditional
system of pub lie recordation of mortgages.

Agard, 444 B.R. at 247.
Critics of the MERS system point out that after bundling many loans
together, it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify the current holder of
any particular loan, or to negotiate with that holder. While not before us,
we note that this is the nub of this and similar litigation and has caused
greater concern about possible errors in foreclosures, misrepresentation,
and fraud.
Under the MERS system, questions of authority and
accountability arise and determining who has authority to negotiate loan
modifications and who is accountable for misrepresentation and fraud
becomes extraordinarily difficult. The MERS system may be inconsistent
with our second objective when interpreting the deed of trust act: that "the
process should provide an adequate opportunity of interested parties to
prevent wrongful foreclosure." Cox, 103 Wash.2d at 387, 693 P.2d 683
(citing Ostrander, 6 Wash. App. 28, 491 P.2d 1058).
The question, to some extent, is whether MERS and its associated
business partners and institutions can both replace the existing recording
system established by Washington statutes and still take advantage oflegal
procedures established in those same statues.

Bain v. Metropolitan Mortgage Group, Inc., 285 P.3d 34, 175 Wn.2d 83
(Wash. 2012).
Unlike some states, Idaho has not enacted amendments designed to "privatize" portions
of the Idaho Trust Deed Act so as to specifically allow for MERS.
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v.
ARGUMENT

1.

MERS Is NOT A LAWFUL "BENEFICIARY" WITHIN THE TERMS OF IDAHO'S TRUST
DEED ACT.

This case, unlike Bain, is about errors in foreclosure, misrepresentation and fraud. The
facts presented to the Court prove MERS' lack of authority, lack of accountability,
misrepresentation, and fraud. MERS' unlawful use of the non-judicial foreclosure statute has,
until this case, insulated it from liability. Appellant's DOT designates MERS both as nominee
and beneficiary. A nominee is a "person designated to act in place of another usu[ ally] in a very
limited way," or a "party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others or who receives and
distributes funds for the benefit of others." Black's Law Dictionary at 1149 (9th ed. 2009); see
also E. Milling Co. v. Flanagan, 152 Me. 380, 382-83, 130 A.2d 925, 936 (1957) (demonstrating

the limited role of a nominee in a contract case). The remaining beneficial rights in Appellant's
DOT are vested solely in the Lender.
None of the deed of trust covenants in Appellant's DOT are made to MERS or in favor of
MERS. Each promise and covenant gives rights to the Lender, whereas MERS' rights are
limited solely to acting as a nominee. In Appellant's DOT, MERS is stated to be the "nominee"
three times.
Appellant's DOT, like millions of others, was sold, aggregated, and resold, in "bundles"
to investment banks for ultimate placement within various "tranches" of a securitized mortgage
loan trust formed in connection with the marketing and sale of exotic investment products in the
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form of Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs),
or other form of mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The bundled and aggregated mortgage
loans were passed through a "Special Purpose Vehicle" (SPV) or Special Investment Vehicle
(SIV) into a securitized mortgage loan trust. These mortgage loans were insured through various
credit enhancements and insurances including Credit Default Swaps (CDS).
When Appellant's loan was securitized it was sold and pooled into a mortgage backed
security trust REMIC.

This trust, the true owner of Appellant's obligation, is governed by

certain operative documents that dictate the actions of any and all agents for the trust, their
powers, and how they may act on behalf of the trust.
The REMIC structure was created in the 1986 amendments to the IRS tax code. A
REMIC trust has a special tax status with the Internal Revenue Service that allows the cash flow
on the pools of loans to "pass through" to the individual certificate holders, thereby avoiding
double taxation on the cash flow-a significant profit advantage to the investors of that trust that
translates into millions of dollars in taxes save.
A REMIC trust has absolutely no power to act outside of the power and authority vested
in it by the trust documents. The governing documents for a REMIC trust are the Prospectus,
Pooling and Servicing Agreement, and the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement.
The only entity that can transfer Appellant's loan is this REMIC trust. If the REMIC
trust has transferred Appellant's obligation to another entity, it is likely that the entire REMIC
trust would lose its tax status and possibly subject all cash flow received by this trust to double
taxation.
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As set forth in the Record, MERS never lent Appellant any money; never demanded any
money from Appellant, was never paid any money by Appellant; and Appellant never received
any documents advising that MERS had purchased his mortgage loan.
As set forth in the Record, Appellant's obligation has been sold, assigned, and transferred
many, many times.

a.

MERS Has No Financial Interest In Appellant's Note.

MERS has no financial interest in Appellant's Note. This is admitted in

~

52 of the

Defendants' Answer. R., p. 251.
MERS' admission of its complete lack of interest in Appellant's Loan is corroborated by
the decision of other courts that have examined the function of MERS. For instance, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has described MERS's complete lack of
substantive involvement in the lending transaction:
MERS is not the lender. It is a membership organization that records,
trades, and forecloses loans on behalf of many lenders, acting for their
accounts rather than its own .... It is a nominee only, holding title to the
mortgage but not the note. Each lender appears to be entitled not only to
payment as the note's equitable (and legal) owner but also to control any
litigation and settlement.

Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Estrella, 390 F.3d 522, 524-25
(7th Cir. 2004).
Similarly, the Nebraska Supreme Court has "conclude[d] that MERS does not acquire
mortgage loans" because "simply stated, MERS has no independent right to collect on any debt
because MERS itself has not extended credit, and none of the mortgage debtors owe MERS any
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money." Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Neb. Dep 't Banking & Fin., 704 N.W.2d 784,
788 (Neb. 2005). This conclusion relied upon MERS's arguments to that court that:
[I]t only holds legal title to members' mortgages in a nominee capacity
and is contractually prohibited from exercising any rights with respect to
the mortgages (i.e. foreclosure) without the authorization of the members.
Further, MERS argues that it does not own the promissory notes secured
by the mortgages and has no right to the payments made on the notes.

Id. at 787 (emphasis added).
The Arkansas Supreme Court "specifically reject[ ed] the notion that MERS may act on
its own, independent of the direction of the specific lender who holds the repayment interest in
the security instrument at the time MERS purports to act." JVfortgage Elec. Registration Sys.,
Inc. v. S. W Homes of Ark., 301 S.W.3d 1, 2009 Ark. 152 (Ark. 2009) (Slip. Op. at 4-5). Based

on that fact, Arkansas' highest court went on to hold that
MERS is not the beneficiary, even though it is so designated in the deed of
trust. Pulaski Mortgage, as the lender on the deed of trust, was the
beneficiary. It receives the payments on the debt.

Id. (slip op. at 6).
The Kansas Court of Appeals, in reviewing the MERS's role in home loan transactions,
rejected the MERS claim that the court was obligated to treat it as the beneficiary of the deed of
trust simply because it is designated as such on the face of the document:
We must pay close attention not only to the terms given to the parties in
carefully crafted documents but also to the roles each party actually
performed. No matter the nomenclature, the true role of a party shapes the
application of legal principles in this case.
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LandmarkNat'l Bankv. Kesler, 192 P.3d 177, 179 (Kan. App. 2008), 216 P.3d 158 (Kan. 2009);
see also, Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Serv., 284 S.W.3d 619, 623 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) cited by U.S.
Magistrate Boyle, Report and Recommendation, Armacost v. HSBC Bank, USA, 1: 10-CV-00274EJL-LMB, decided February 9, 2011, adopted by U.S. District Judge Lodge on March 2, 2011.

b.

MERS Cannot Proceed On Behalf Of The Loan Owner Because It Does Not
Possess The Note And Does Not Represent And Is Not The Agent Of The
Holder Of Appellant's Note.

MERS admits at

~

55 of its Answer (R., p. 251) that it does not represent and is not the

agent of the current holder of the Appellant's Note. See In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511, 517 (Bankr.
C.O. Cal. 2008) ("If [the original lender] has transferred the note, MERS is no longer an
authorized agent of the holder unless it has a separate agency contract with the new undisclosed
principal.") The pleadings conclusively prove that the original lender, Homecomings does not
own the Loan and that MERS does not hold possession of the Note and does not represent and is
not the agent of the current owner.
MERS, which has neither a financial interest in Appellant's Loan nor a role recognized
by traditional mortgage law, has fabricated a legal fiction that has no basis in Idaho law.
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2.

MERS HAS IGNORED THE RECORDING REQUIREMENTS

OF IDAHO CODE§ 45-1505(1).

In this case MERS admits that assignments of both the Appellant's Note and Appellant's

DOT have been made but fail to identify the assignee or owner and fail to offer any paper
evidencing the assignments.
Appellant's Note and DOT have been assigned without recourse (R., p. 250,
251,

if 50), no

if 48

and p.

sale, transfer or assignment of Appellant's DOT has been recorded (R., p. 249,

if

40), none of the Defendants have any financial interest in Appellant's Note or DOT they seek to
foreclose (R., p. 251,

if 52 and p.

253,

if 78), but still MERS

expects this Court to believe that it

has substantive rights in Appellant's Note and DOT.
Contrary to its pleading and discovery responses, MERS' counsel represented to the trial
court that there had been no assignments.
Mr. McGee: There were no assignments, and then that's the issue here.
There were no assignments of the deed of trust.
What we have here is a loan, which was sold on the secondary
market. The security for that note --follows that note around, and so long
as it's held by a members of MERS, MERS remains as the nominee
beneficiary.
Tr., p. 45, ll. 10-18.
The trial court found that MERS' structure skirts Idaho law requiring the recording of the
assignment of the deed of trust. The trial court also acknowledged the analysis in Niday v.

GMAC Mortg., LLC, 284 P.3d 1157, 251 Or.App. 278 (Or.App. 2012) under which the MERS
structure cannot use the statutory non-judicial foreclosure structure as the necessary predicate-
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publicly recording the assignment of the lender's beneficial interest-is absent.
Idaho law also requires publicly recorded assignments. For that reason MERS cannot
legally initiate the foreclosure sale of Appellant's home. See also, Expert Rebuttal Report of
Richard Eppink, R., pp. 1710-1722.

3.

WHAT

Is

THE LEGAL EFFECT OF MERS ACTING As AN UNLAWFUL BENEFICIARY

UNDER THE TERMS OF IDAHO'S DEED OF TRUST Acr?

Initially MERS must halt its use of the non-judicial foreclosure provisions of the Idaho
Trust Deed Act. MERS' conduct is negligent and in violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection
Act.
4.

APPELLANT'S CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST MERS.

a.

Negligence.

This Court has held "that negligent conduct and breach of contract are two distinct
theories of recovery . . . . A tort requires the wrongful invasion of an interest protected by the
law, not merely an invasion of an interest created by the agreement of the parties." Just 's, Inc. v.

Arrington Construction Co., Inc., 583 P.2d 997, 1003 (Idaho 1978).

Active negligence or

misfeasance is necessary to support an action in tort based upon a breach of contract." Galbraith
v. Bangas, Inc., 655 P.2d 119, 121 (Ct. App. 1982) (citing Taylor v. Herbold, 483 P.2d 664
(Idaho 1971) (emphasis in original).
Appellant's home is an interest protected by the law. MERS' conduct is not merely an
invasion or breach of contract, but is a concerted, deliberate and purposeful end run around all
applicable laws. A deed of trust is a contract specifying statutory and contractual duties.
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MERS has breached the contract in its failure to disclose that it has no recognized
substantive or financial interest in Appellant's DOT; that it is required by its own Rule 8 to
record in Ada County, Idaho the assignment of its interest to the last lender prior to commencing
a non-judicial foreclosure; that it knowingly violated its own Rule 8; that it knowingly violated
Idaho Code § 45-1505( 1), which mandates that assignment be recorded prior to commencing
foreclosure; that it relies upon "certifying officers," which it knows are robo-signers; that it
breached its obligation to comply with the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act by its failure
to adequately respond to Appellant's QWRs; and its violation of the Home Affordable Loan
Modification Guidelines by denial of Appellant's three separate applications. See also, Expert
Rebuttal Report of Richard Eppink, R., pp. 1710-1722.
b.

Idaho Consumer Protection Act.

Idaho Code § 48-603 declares, to be unlawful, where a person knows, or in the exercise
of due care should know, that he has in the past, or is:
(3) Causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to
affiliation, connection, or association with, or certification by another;
(17) Engaging in any act or practice which is otherwise misleading, false,
deceptive to the consumer.
The complexity of the incestuous relationship, the undisclosed conflicts, the violations of
Idaho law set forth above are intended to and do create confusion, mislead, are false, and are
deceptive.
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5.

APPELLANT
RESULT

Is

ENTITLED

To

AN AWARD

OF

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

As

A

OF Tms APPEAL.

Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) and I.A.R 35(a)(5) Appellant, as the prevailing party
in this appeal, shall be entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs.

VI.
CONCLUSION
Despite being presented with overwhelming evidence of MERS' unlawful use of Idaho's
non-judicial foreclosure statute and state, Federal, and Bankruptcy court decisions that have
consistently held that MERS is not a "beneficiary" entitled to foreclose Appellant's DOT, the
trial court granted MERS' Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court's ruling must be
reversed and this case remanded for jury trial.

Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of April 2013.
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certified that on this 2nd day of April 2013, a true and correct
copy of the APPELLANT'S BRIEF was served upon opposing counsel as follows:
Michael G. Halligan, ISB No. 6874
Sussman Shank LLP
1000 SW Broadway, Suite 1400
Portland, OR 97205-3089

US Mail
- - Personal Delivery
- - Facsimile
~-

RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

J
Attorney for Appellant
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EXCERPTS FROM
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint
and
Homecomings Financial, LLC, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. Aud Executive
Trustee Services, LLC's Answer To First Amended Complaint And Demand For Jury Trial
Para.

50

51

Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint

In August 2010 Renshaw was served with (1)
Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed
of Trust (See, Exhibit 9) and (2) Notice of
Trustee's Sale (See, Exhibit l 0).
In August 2010, Renshaw also received a Debt
Validation Notice naming Mortgage Electronic
Systems, [nc as his current creditor. See, Exhibit
11.

Para.

Homecomings Financial, LLC, Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. And
Executive Trustee Services, LLC's Answer
To First Amended Complaint And Demand
For Jury Trial

34

Defendants admit the allegations in paragraphs
50 - 53 and further state that the documents
speak for themselves.

34

Defendants admit the allegations in paragraphs
50 - 53 and futiher state that the documents
speak for themselves.

52

Homecomings, MERS, and Trustee have
scheduled a foreclosure sale of Renshaw' s home
for Dccember29, 2010 at 1:00 p.m. See, Exhibits
9andl0.

34

Defendants admit the allegations in paragraphs
50 - 53 and further state that the documents
speak for themselves.

53

The Notice of Default and Election to Sell
(Exhibit 9) and the Notice of Trustee's Sale
(Exhibit I 0) state that the beneficiary interest in
Renshaw's property is held by Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.

34

Defendants admit the allegations in paragraphs
50 - 53 and further state that the documents
speak for themselves.

61

No sale, transfer or assignment of Renshaw's
Deed of Trust has been recorded in Ada County,
Idaho.

40

With respect to the allegations in paragraph 61.
upon information and belief, Defendants admit
the allegations and further state that the records
of the Ada County Recorder speak for
themselves.

----·-----

__._._.

____

63

Renshaw on October 15, 20 I 0 has, by a qualified
written request, requested that the current holder
of the Note and the current holder of the Deed of
Trust be identified and that the scheduled
foreclosure sale be cancelled. See, Exhibit 12.

42

Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph
63 and further state that the document speaks
for itself.

66

Renshaw, again, on November 11, 20 I 0, by a
qualified written request, requested that certain
documents be produced and that the scheduled
foreclosure sale be cancelled. See, Exhibit 14.
Homecomings is not the current holder of the
Renshaw Note.

45

Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph
66 and further state that the document speaks
for itself.

47

Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph
68 -70.

68

-·

-·--------·--·-·-

APPENDIX I

69

Homecomings is not in possession of the
Renshaw Note.

47

Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph
68 -70.

70

Homecomings is not the current beneficiary of the
Renshaw Deed of Trust.

47

Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph
68 -70.

-··--··--- -·

~--·---··--·-·---------

71

Homecomings has assigned the Renshaw Note
without recourse.

48

With respect to the allegations in paragraph 71,
Defendants admit that Homecomings has
transferred its interest in the Renshaw Note.

73

Homecomings has assigned the Renshaw Deed of
Trust without recourse.

50

With respect to the allegations in paragraph 73,
Defendants admit that Homecomings has
transferred its interest in the Renshaw Deed of
Trust.

75

MERS has no financial interest in the Renshaw
Note.

52

Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph
75.

-·-----·- -·-·--·- -------------

77

Homecomings does not represent and is not the
agent of the current holder of the Renshaw Note.

54

The allegations in paragraphs 77 - 78 state
legal conclusions to which no affirmative
response is required. To the extent a response
is required, Defendants admit the same.

78

Homecomings does not represent and is not the
agent of the current holder of the Renshaw Deed
of Trust.

54

The allegations in paragraphs 77 - 78 state
legal conclusions to which no affirmative
response is required. To the extent a response
is required, Defendants admit the same.

79

MERS does not represent and is not the agent of
the current holder of the Renshaw Note.

55

The allegations in paragraph 79 state legal
conclusions to which no affirmative response is
required. To the extent a response is required,
Defendants admit MERS does not "represent"
the current holder of the Note and deny it is not
the "agent" of the same.

81

That the Renshaw Deed of Trust names Pioneer
Title Company of Ada County as trustee.

57

Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph
81 and state that the document speaks for itself

123

Homecomings is not the beneficiary of the Deed
of Trust.

76

Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph
123.

125

Homecomings has no interest in the Note or Deed
of Trust it seeks to foreclose.

78

With respect to the allegations in paragraph
125, Defendants admit only that Homecomings
has no interest in the Note or Deed of Trust.
Defendants deny the remaining allegations.

127

Homecomings does not hold possession of the
Note.

80

Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph
127.

2

135--

136

That Homecomings, MERS and Trustee have
stated the following facts to Renshaw:
a. That MERS is the beneficiary of the
Deed of Trust.
b. That MERS has the authority to
foreclose on Renshaw's property.
c. That Homecomings has the authority to
foreclose on Renshaw's property.
d. That Trustee has the authority to
foreclose on Renshaw's property.
That such statements are false.

3

85

Defendants admit the allegations in subparts
(a) and (b) of paragraph 135, and deny the
allegations in subpart (c) of paragraph 135 to
the extent it references statements regarding
the present status of the loan. With respect to
subpart (d), Defendants admit Defendants may
have represented that the Trustee has the
authority to hold a foreclosure sale.

86

With respect to the allegations in paragraph
136, Defendants deny that those statements in
subparts (a) and (b) of paragraph 13 5 are false.
Defendants admit that the statement in subpart
(c) is presently false. Defendants admit that the
statement in subpart (d) is false, but clarify by
stating that the Trustee has the authority to
hold a foreclosure sale.

EXCERPTS FROM
Plaintiff's First Set Oflnterrogatories, Requests For Production Of Documents, And Requests For
Admission To Defendant Homecomings Financial, LLC

and
Defendant Homecomings Financial, LLC's Answers And Responses To Plaintiffs First Set Of
Interrogatories And Requests For Production Of Documents

Plaintiff's First Set Oflnterrogatories, Requests
For Production Of Documents, And Requests For
Admission To Defendant Homecomings Financial,

LLC
INTERROGATORY NO. I 0: Identify the current and

all former holders of the Renshaw Promissory Note
and Renshaw DOT.

------------·----·--~-----------------·--··----

INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Identify the custodian
of the Renshaw Promissory Note and Renshaw DOT.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
NO. 3: Produce the original Renshaw Promissory
Note and any endorsements and the original Renshaw
DOT and any assignments.

Defendant Homecomings Financial, LLC's Answers
And Responses To Plaintiffs First Set Of
Interrogatories And Requests For Production Of
Documents
ANSWER NO. IO: Homecomings objects to this
interrogatory on the grounds that it is compound, vague,
ambiguous, and undefined as to the meaning of the terms
"holders of the Renshaw Promissory Note and Renshaw
DOT." Without waiving these objections, Homecomings
identifies the following entities as current and former
investors in the Renshaw Promissory Note and Renshaw
DOT: Idaho Home Loan Mortgage Corporation,
Residential Funding Company, LLC, Homecomings
Financial, LLC. Homecomings identifies the following
entities as current and former servicers and subservicers of
the loan: GMAC Mo1tgage, LLC, Homecomings
Financial, LLC, Residential Funding Company, LLC.
Please also see Bates range HF000598 to HF000602.
Further, discovery is ongoing. Therefore, Homecomings
reserves the right to supplement this answer as appropriate
in accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
and/or any relevant orders of the court.
---- - · - - · · - - - - - - - - - - - - · - · - - - - - · - · - - - - - - - - j

ANSWER NO. I I: Homecomings objects to this
interrogatory on the grounds that it is compound, vague,
ambiguous, and undefined as to the meaning of the term
"custodian." Without waiving these objections,
Homecomings identifies the "custodian" of the Renshaw
Promissory Note and Renshaw DOT as the MERS
ce1tifying officer of GMAC Mortgage, LLC. Further,
discovery is ongoing. Therefore, 1-Iomecomings reserves
the right to supplement this answer as appropriate in
accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and/or
any relevant orders of the court.

RESPONSE N0.3: Homecomings objects to this request
on the grounds that it is unduly burdensome and because
Homecomings does not possess the "original" Renshaw
Promissory Note or the "original" Renshaw DOT. Please
also see Answer to Interrogatory No. 11. Moreover, the
"original" Renshaw DOT was duly filed and recorded in
Ada County as Instrument No. I 07095032. Further,
discovery is ongoing. Therefore, Homecomings reserves
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the right to supplement this answer as appropriate in
accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and/or
any relevant orders of the court,
RESPONSE N0.5: Homecomings objects to this request
on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, and undefined
as to the meaning of the terms "owner" and "holder."
Without waiving these o~jections, please see Bates range
HF000598 to HF000602. Further, discovery is ongoing.
Therefore, Homecomings reserves the right to supplement
this answer as appropriate in accordance with the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure and/or any relevant orders of the

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
NO. 5: Produce all documents naming the current
and all former owners or holders of the Renshaw
Promissory Note.

COUit,

RESPONSE N0.6: Homecomings objects to this request
on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, and undefined
as to the meaning of the terms "owner" and "holder."
Without waiving these objections, please see Bates range
HF000598 to HF000602. Further, discovery is ongoing.
Therefore, Homecomings reserves the right to supplement
this answer as appropriate in accordance with the Idaho
Rules of Civ ii Procedure and/or any relevant orders of the
court,

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

NO. 6: Produce all documents naming the current
and all former owners or holders of the Renshaw
DOT.
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EXCERPTS FROM
Plaintiff's First Set Of Interrogatories, Requests For Production Of.Documents, And Requests For
Admission To Defendant Homecomings Financial, LLC

and
Defendant Homecomings Financial, LLC's Answers To Plaintiffs First Set Of Requests For
Admission
Plaintiff's First Set Of Interrogatories, Requests
For Production Of Documents, And Requests For
Admission To Defendant Homecomings Financial,

Defendant Homecomings Financial, LLC's Answers To
Plaintiffs First Set Of Requests For Admission

LLC
RESPONSE NO. 43: Homecomings objects to this request
on the grounds that it constitutes an effort to harass and
annoy Homecomings. This Request for Admission, and
nearly every other Request for Admission in this set of
discovery requests, recites verbatim the factual allegations
and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set fotth in
Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. Homecomings has
filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qualifies the
admission or denial with explanation in accordance with
the requirements and responsibilities of a party answering
a complaint, as well as the requirements of Rule 36(a).
Without waiving such objection, Homecomings asserts
that it has made reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the
information is known or readily obtainable, admits,
denies, or qualifies its admission or denial by reference to
its Answer as follows:

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 43: Admit that
you, MERS, and Trustee scheduled a foreclosure sale
of Renshaw's home for December 29, 20 I 0 at l:OO
p.111. See., Exhibits 9 and I 0 to Plaintiffs' First
Amended Complaint.

34. Defendants admit the allegations in
paragraphs 50 - 53 and further state that the
documents speak for themselves.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 51: Admit that
any effott to foreclose a deed of trust by a party
lacking authority to carry out a foreclosure is void.

RESPONSE NO. 51: Homecomings objects to this request
on the grounds that it requests admission of a pure
conclusion of law, to which no response is required.
Without waiving such objection, Homecomings answers
by admitting only that non-judicial foreclosure of a deed
of trust should comply with the requirements of the Idaho
Trust Deed Act, I.e. § 45- 1502, et seq.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 68: Admit that
you are not the current holder of the Renshaw
Promissory Note.

RESPONSE NO. 68: Homecomings objects to this request
on the grounds that it constitutes an e:ffo1t to harass and
annoy Homecomings. This Request for Admission, and
nearly every other Request for Admission in this set of
discovery requests, recites verbatim the factual allegations
and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set forth in
Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. Homecomings has
filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qualifies the
admission or denial with explanation in accordance with
the requirements and responsibilities of a party answering
a complaint, as well as the requirements of Rule 36(a).
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Without waiving such objection, Homecomings asserts
that it has made reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the
information is known or readily obtainable, admits,
denies, or qualifies its admission or denial by reference to
its Answer as follows:
47. Defendants admit the allegations in
paragraph 68 - 70.

RESPONSE NO. 69: Homecomings objects to this request
on the grounds that it constitutes an effort to harass and
annoy Homecomings. This Request for Admission, and
nearly every other Request for Admission in this set of
discove1y requests, recites verbatim the factual allegations
and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set forth in
Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. Homecomings has
filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qualifies the
admission or denial with explanation in accordance with
the requirements and responsibilities of a party answering
a complaint, as well as the requirements of Rule 36(a).
Without waiving such objection, Homecomings asse1ts
that it has made reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the
information is known or readily obtainable, admits,
denies, or qualifies its admission or denial by reference to
its Answer as follows:

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 69: Admit that
you are not in possession of the Renshaw Promissory
Note.

47. Defendants admit the allegations in
paragraph 68 - 70.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 70: Admit that
you are not the current beneficiary of the Renshaw
DOT.

RESPONSE NO. 70: Homecomings objects to this request
on the grounds that it constitutes an effolt to harass and
annoy Homecomings. This Request for Admission, and
nearly every other Request for Admission in this set of
discovery requests, recites verbatim the factual allegations
and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set forth in
Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. Homecomings has
filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qualifies the
admission or denial with explanation in accordance with
the requirements and responsibi Ii ties of a party answering
a complaint, as well as the requirements of Rule 36(a).
Without waiving such objection, Homecomings asserts
that it has made reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the
information is known or readily obtainable, admits,
denies, or qualifies its admission or denial by reference to
its Answer as follows:
4 7. Defendants admit the allegations in
paragraph 68 -70.
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7 I: Admit that
you assigned the Renshaw Promissory Note without
recourse.

RESPONSE NO. 71: Homecomings objects to th is request
on the grounds that it constitutes an effo1t to harass and
annoy Homecomings. This Request for Admission, and
nearly every other Request for Admission in this set of
discovery requests, recites verbatim the factual al legations
and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set fotth in
Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. Homecomings has
filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qualifies the
admission or denial with explanation in accordance with
the requirements and responsibilities of a party answering
a complaint, as well as the requirements of Rule 36(a).
Without waiving such objection, Homecomings asse1ts
that it has made reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the
information is known or readily obtainable, admits,
denies, or qualifies its admission or denial by
reference to its Answer as follows:
48. With respect to the allegations in paragraph
71. Defendants admit that Homecomings has
transferred its interest in the Renshaw Note.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 72: Admit that
only the holder of the Renshaw Promissory Note and
the Renshaw DOT or other authorized person or
entity may foreclose the Renshaw DOT.

RESPONSE NO. 72: Homecomings objects to this request
on the grounds that it is overbroad and vague, in part,
because "authorized person or entity" is undefined.
Homecomings also objects because it requests admission
of a legal conclusion, Without waiving such objections,
Homecomings admits that authorized persons or entities
may foreclose the Renshaw DOT.

REQUEST FOR ADMISS[ON NO. 75: Admit that
you assigned the Renshaw DOT without recourse.

RESPONSE NO. 75: Homecomings objects to this request
on the grounds that it constitutes an effort to harass and
annoy Homecomings. This Request for Admission, and
nearly every other Request for Admission in this set of
discovery requests, recites verbatim the factual allegations
and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set forth in
Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. Homecomings has
filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qualifies the
admission or denial with explanation in accordance with
the requirements and responsibilities of a party answering
a complaint, as well as the requirements of Rule 36(a).
Without waiving such objection, Homecomings asserts
that it has made reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the
information is known or readily obtainable, admits,
denies, or qualifies its admission or denial by reference to
its Answer as follows:
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50. With respect to the allegations in paragraph
73. Defendants admit that Homecomings has
transferred its interest in the Renshaw Deed of
Trust.
RESPONSE NO. 82: Homecomings objects to this request
on the grounds that it constitutes an effort to harass and
annoy Homecomings. This Request for Admission, and
nearly every other Request for Admission in this set of
discovery requests, recites verbatim the factual allegations
and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set forth in
Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. Homecomings has
filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qua! ifies the
admission or denial with explanation in accordance with
the requirements and responsibilities of a party answering
a complaint, as well as the requirements of Rule 36(a).
Without waiving such objection, Homecomings asserts
that it has made reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the
information is known or readily obtainable, admits,
denies, or qualifies its admission or denial by reference to
its Answer as follows:

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 82: Admit that
you do not represent and you are not the agent of the
current holder of the Renshaw Promissory Note.

54. The allegations in paragraphs 77 - 78 state
legal conclusions to which no affirmative
response is required. To the extent a response is
required, Defendants admit the same.
RESPONSE NO. 83: Homecomings objects to this request
on the grounds that it constitutes an effort to harass and
annoy Homecomings. This Request for Admission, and
nearly every other Request for Admission in tins set of
discovery requests, recites verbatim the factual allegations
and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set forth in
Renshaw's first Amended Complaint. Homecomings has
filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qualifies the
admission or denial with explanation in accordance with
the requirements and responsibilities of a party answering
a complaint, as well as the requirements of Rule 36(a).
Without waiving such objection, Homecomings asserts
that it has made reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the
information is known or readily obtainable, admits,
denies, or qualifies its admission or denial by reference to
its Answer as follows:

REQUEST FOR ADMISS[ON NO. 83: Admit that

you do not represent and you are not the agent of the
current holder of the Renshaw DOT.

54. The allegations in paragraphs 77 - 78 state
legal conclusions to which no affirmative
response is required. To the extent a response is
required, Defendants admit the same.
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RESPONSE NO. 84: Homecomings objects to this request
on the grounds that it constitutes an effo1i to harass and
annoy Homecomings. This Request for Admission, and
nearly every other Request for Admission in this set of
discove1y requests, recites verbatim the factual allegations
and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set forth in
Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. Homecomings has
filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qual iftes the
admission or denial with explanation in accordance with
the requirements and responsibilities ofa party answering
a complaint, as well as the requirements ofRulc 36(a).
Without waiving such objection, Homecomings asserts
that it has made reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the
information is known or readily obtainable, admits,
denies, or qualifies its admission or denial by reference to
its Answer as follows:

REQUEST FOR ADMISSlON NO. 84: Admit that
MERS has no financial interest in the Renshaw
Promissory Note.

52. Defendants admit the allegations in
paragraph 75.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 86: Admit that
MERS does not represent and is not the agent of the
current holder of the Renshaw Promissory Note.

RESPONSE NO. 86: Homecomings objects to this request
on the grounds that it constitutes an effort to harass and
annoy Homecomings. This Request for Admission, and
nearly every other Request for Admission in this set of
discovery requests, recites verbatim the factual allegations
and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set forth in
Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. Homecomings has
filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qualifies the
admission or denial with explanation in accordance with
the requirements and responsibilities of a party answering
a complaint, as well as the requirements of Rule 36(a).
Without waiving such objection, Homecomings asserts
that it has made reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the
information is known or readily obtainable, admits,
denies, or qualifies its admission or denial by reference to
its Answer as follows:
55. The allegations in paragraph 79 state legal
conclusions to which no affirmative response is
required. To the extent a response is required,
Defendants admit MERS does not "represent"
the current holder of the Note and deny it is not
the "agent" of the same.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSfON NO. 11 I: Admit that
you are not the beneficiary of the Renshaw DOT.

RESPONSE NO. 111: Homecomings objects to this
request on the grounds that it constitutes an effort to
harass and annoy Homecomings. This Request for
Admission, and nearly evety other Request for Admission
in this set of discovery requests, recites verbatim the
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factual allegations and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set
forth in Renshaw's First Amended Complaint.
Homecomings has filed an Answer that fair! y admits,
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as wet I
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such
objection, Homecomings asse1ts that it has made
reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the information is
known or readily obtainable, admits, denies, or qualifies
its admission or denial by reference to its Answer as
follows:
76. Defendants admit the allegations in
paragraph 123.
RESPONSE NO. 115: Homecomings objects to this
request on the grounds that it constitutes an effort to
harass and annoy Homecomings. This Request for
Admission, and nearly every other Request for Admission
in this set of discovery requests, recites verbatim the
factual allegations and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set
forth in Renshaw's First Amended Complaint.
Homecomings has filed an Answer that fairly admits,
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such
objection, Homecomings asserts that it has made
reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the information is
known or readily obtainable, admits, denies, or qualifies
its admission or denial by reference to its Answer as
follows:

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. I 15: Admit that
you do not hold possession of the Renshaw
Promissory Note.

80. Defendants admit the allegations in
paragraph 127.
REQUEST FOR ADMlSSfON NO. 123: Admit
that you, MERS, and Trustee stated the following
facts to Renshaw:
a. That MERS is the beneficiary of the Deed
of Trust.
b. That MERS has the authority to foreclose
on Renshaw's property.
c. That you have the authority to foreclose
on Renshaw's property.
d. That Trustee has the authority to foreclose
on Renshaw's property.

RESPONSE NO. l 23: Homecomings objects to this
request on the grounds that it constitutes an effort to
harass and annoy Homecom"ings. This Request for
Admission, and nearly every other Request for Admission
in this set of discovery requests, recites verbatim the
factual allegations and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set
forth in Renshaw's First Amended Complaint.
Homecomings has filed an Answer that fairly admits,
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such
objection, Homecomings asse1ts that it has made
reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the information is
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known or readily obtainable, admits, denies, or qualifies
its admission or denial by reference to its Answer as
follows:
85. Defendants admit the allegations in subparts
(a) and (b) of paragraph 135, and deny the
allegations in subpait (c) of paragraph 13 5 to the
extent it references statements regarding the
present status of the loan. With respect to
subpart (d), Defendants adrn it Defendants may
have represented that the Trustee ltas the
authority to hold a foreclosure sale.
REOUEST FOR ADMISSfON NO. 124: Admit
that such statements (see above Request for
Admission No. 123) are false.

RESPONSE NO. 124: Homecomings objects to this
request on the grounds that it constitutes an effort to
harass and annoy Homecomings. This Request for
Admission, and nearly every other Request for Admission
in this set of discovery requests, recites verbatim the
factual allegations and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set
forth in Renshaw's First Amended Complaint.
Homecomings has filed an Answer that fairly admits,
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a party ansvvering a complaint, as well
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such
objection, Homecomings asserts that it has made
reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the information is
known or readily obtainable, admits, denies, or qualifies
its admission or denial by reference to its Answer as
follows:
86. With respect to the allegations in paragraph
136, Defendants deny that those statements in
subparts (a) and (b) of paragraph l35 are false.
Defendants admit that the statement in subpart
(c) is presently false. Defendants admit that the
statement in subpart (cl) is false, but clarify by
stating that the Trustee has the authority to hold
a foreclosure sale.
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EXCERPTS FROM
Plaintifrs First Set Oflnterrogatories, Requests For Production Of Documents, And Requests For
Admission to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.

and
Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.'s Answers And Responses To Plaintiff's
First Set Of Interrogatories, Requests For Production Of Documents, And Requests For Admission

~--------------------~~------------------------

Plaintiff's First Set Of Interrogatories, Requests
For Production Of Documents, And Requests
For Admission
to
Mortgage
Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc.

Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,
Inc.'s Answers Auel Responses To Plaintiff's First Set
Oflnterrogatories, Requests Ji'or Production Of
Documents, And Requests For Admission

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION N0.8: Admit that in
August 2010, Renshaw also received a Debt
Validation Notice naming Mortgage Electronic
Systems, Inc [sic] as his current creditor. See, Exhibit
I I to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION N0.8:
MERS objects to this request on the grounds that it
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy MERS. 'fhis
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended
Complaint. MERS has filed an Answer that fairly admits,
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such
objection, MERS admits this request.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. IO: Admit that
the Notice of Default and Election to Sell (Exhibit 9 to
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint) and the Notice
of Trustee's Sale (Exhibit IO to Plaintiffs' First
Amended Complaint) state that the beneficiary
interest in Renshaw's property is held by Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 25: Admit that no
sale, transfer or assignment of Ren shaw's DOT has
been recorded in Ada County, ldaho.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. IO:
MERS objects to this request on the grounds that it
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy MERS. This
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request ·
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended
Complaint. MERS has filed an Answer that fairly admits,
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such
objection, MERS admits this request.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 25:
MERS objects to this request on the grounds that it
constitutes an effo1t to harass and annoy MERS. This
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended
Complaint. MERS has filed an Answer that fairly admits,
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well
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as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such
objection, MERS asserts that it has made reasonable
inquiry, and to the extent the information is known or
readily obtainable, admits this request.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 27: Admit that
Renshaw on October 15, 2010 has, by a qualified
written request, requested that the current holder of
the Renshaw Promissory Note and the current holder
of the Renshaw DOT be identified and that the
scheduled foreclosure sale be cancelled. See, Exhibit
12 to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMlSSION NO. 27:
MERS objects to this request on the grounds that it
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy MERS. This
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended
Complaint. MERS has filed an Answer that fairly admits,
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsib ii ities of a party answering a complaint, as well
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such
objection, MERS admits this request.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 32: Admit that on
November 19, 2010 Renshaw, through his attorney,
received a letter stating that MERS " ... acts solely as
a nominee for Lender. .. " See, Exhibit 15 to Plaintiffs'
First Amended Complaint.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 32:
MERS objects to this request on the grounds that it
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy MERS. This
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of
Renshaw set fo1th in Renshaw's First Amended
Complaint. MERS has filed an Answer that fairly admits,
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such
objection, MERS admits that Renshaw, through his
attorney, received a letter stating that MERS 11 ••• acts
solely as a nominee for Lender ... 11

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 47: Admit that
the Renshaw DOT names Pioneer Title Company of
Ada County as trustee.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMfSSION NO. 47:
MERS objects to this request onthe grounds that it
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy MERS. This
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended
Complaint. MERS has filed an Answer that fairly admits,
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a paity answering a complaint, as well
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such
objection, MERS admits this request.
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSfON NO. 48: Admit that
Trustee is not the trustee of the Renshaw DOT.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 48:
MERS objects to this request on the grounds that it
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy MERS. This
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended
Complaint. MERS has filed an Answer that fairly admits,
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such
objection, MERS asserts that it has made reasonable
inquiry, and to the extent the information is known or
readily obtainable, admits that Executive Trustee Services
is not the trustee of the Renshaw DOT, but qualifies the
admission by stating that Executive Trustee Services does
not purport to be the trustee of the Renshaw DOT.
Executive Trustee Services is the attorney-in-fact for
Pioneer Lender Trustee Services d/b/a Pioneer Title
Company of Ada County.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSfON NO. 64: Admit that
you knew of the Renshaw Promissory Note and
Renshaw DOT.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 69: Admit that
Homecomings is not the beneficiary of the Renshaw
DOT.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 64:
MERS objects to this request on the grounds that it
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy MERS. This
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended
Complaint. MERS has filed an Answer that fairly admits,
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well
as the requirements of Rule 36( a). Without waiving such
objection, MERS admits this request.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 69:
MERS objects to this request on the grounds that it
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy MERS. This
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended
Complaint. MERS has filed all Answer that fairly admits,
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a paity answering a complaint, as well
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as the requirements of Rule 36(a). MERS further objects
to this request on the grounds that it requests admission of
a pure conclusion oflaw. Without waiving such objections,
MERS admits.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7 I: Admit that
Homecomings has no interest in the Renshaw
Promissory Note or Deed of Trust.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 71:
MERS objects to this request on the grounds that it is
compound and vague and constitutes an effort to harass
and annoy MERS. This Request for Admission, and nearly
every other Request for Admission in this set of discovery
requests, recites verbatim the factual allegations and/or
legal contentions of Renshaw set fotth in Renshaw's First
Amended Complaint. !VIERS has filed an Answer that
fairly admits, denies, or qualifies the admission or denial
with explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such
objection, MERS admits this request.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 81:
MERS objects to this request on the grounds that it
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy MERS, This
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended
Complaint. MERS has filed an Answer that fairly admits,
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such
objection, MERS asserts that it has made reasonable
inquiry, and to the extent the information is known or
readily obtainable, admits subparts (a) and (b ), and denies
the allegations in subpart (c) to the extent it references
statements regarding the present status of the loan. With
respect to subpart ( d), !VIERS denies.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 81:
Admit that you, Trustee, and Homecomings stated the
following facts to Renshaw:
a.

That MERS is the beneficiary of the Deed of
Trust.

b.

That MERS has the authority to foreclose on
Renshaw's property.

c.

That Homecomings has the authority to
foreclose on Renshaw's property.

cl. That Trustee has the authority to foreclose on
Renshaw's property.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 82: Admit that
such statements (see above Request for Admission
No. 8l)arefalse.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 82:
MERS objects to this request on the grounds that it
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy MERS. This
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites
verbatim the factual and/or legal contentions of Renshaw
set forth in Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. MERS
has filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qualifies
the admission or denial with explanation in accordance
with the requirements and responsibilities of a party
answering a complaint, as well as the requirements of
Rule 36(a). Without waiving such objection, MERS
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asserts that it has made reasonable inquiry, and to the
extent the information is known or readily obtainable,
denies that those statements in subparts (a) and (b) are
false. MERS admits that the statement in subpart (c) is
presently false. MERS admits that the statement in subpart
(cl) is false, but clarifies by stating that Executive Trustee
Services, as attorney-in-fact for Pioneer Title Company
d/b/a Pioneer Lender Trustee Services, has the authority to
foreclosure.
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EXCERPTS FROM
Plaintiff's First Set Oflnterrogatories, Requests For Production Of Documents, And Requests For
Admission to Executive Trustee Services, LLC

and
Defendant Executive Trustee Services, LLC's Answers And Responses To Plaintiffs First Set Of
Interrogatories, Requests For Production Of Documents, And Requests For Admission

Plaintiff's First Set Of Interrogatories, Requests
For Production Of Documents, And Requests
For Admission to Executive Trustee Services,

LLC

Defendant Executive Trustee Services, LLC's Answers
And Responses To Plai11tiff's First Set Of
Interrogatories, Requests For Production Of
Documents, And Requests For Admission

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. I: Admit that
you prepared and de! ivered to Renshaw:

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. I:
Admit.

a.

Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under
Deed of Trust - Exhibit 9 to First Amended
Complaint.

b. Notice of Trustee's Sale - Exhibit I 0 to First
Amended Complaint.
c.

Debt Validation Notice - Exhibit 11 to First
Amended Complaint.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8: Admit that in
August 2010 Renshaw was served with ( 1) Notice of
Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust
(See, Exhibit 9 to Plaintiffs' First Amended
Complaint) and (2) Notice of Trustee's Sale (See,
Exhibit l 0 to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint).

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 9: Admit that in
August 20 I0, Renshaw also received a Debt
Validation Notice naming Mortgage Electronic
Systems, Inc as his current creditor. See, Exhibit 11 to
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION N0.8:
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy ETS. Th is
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of
Renshaw set fo1th in Renshaw's First Amended
Complaint. ETS has filed an Answer that fairly admits,
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such
objection, ETS admits this request.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION N0.9:
objects to this request on the grounds that it constitutes an
effort to harass and annoy ETS. This Request for
Admission, and nearly every other Request for Admission
in this set of discovery requests, recites verbatim the
factual allegations and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set
forth in Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. ETS has
filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qualifies the
admission or denial with explanation in accordance with
the requirements and responsibilities of a party answering
a complaint, as well as the requirements of Rule 36(a).
Without waiving such objection, ETS admits this request.

~--------------------~~---------------------···-···-·

APPENDIX 5

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. I 0:
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it
constitutes an effo1i to harass and annoy ETS. This
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended
Complaint. ETS has filed an Answer that fairly admits,
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well
as the requirements of Ru le 36(a). Without waiving such
objection, ETS admits this request.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. I 0: Admit that
you, MERS, and Homecomings scheduled a
foreclosure sale of Renshaw's home for December 29,
20 I 0 at I :00 p.m. See, Exhibits 9 and 10 to Plaintiffs'
First Amended Complaint.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11:
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy ETS. This
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended
Complaint. ETS has filed an Answer that fairly admits,
denies, or qualifies the aclm ission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well
as the requirements. of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such
objection, ETS admits this request.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11: Admit that
the Notice of Default and Election to Sell (Exhibit 9 to
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint) and the Notice
of Trustee's Sale (Exhibit I0 to Plaintiffs' First
Amended Complaint) state that the beneficiary
interest in Rcnshaw's property is held by Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12: Admit that
M ERS is not the beneficial owner of the Renshaw
DOT. See, Deed of Trust, Exhibit 7 to Plaintiffs' First
Amended Complaint.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12:
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy ETS. This
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended
Complaint. ETS has filed an Answer that fairly admits,
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). ETS further objects to
the term "beneficial owner" because that term is vague,
ambiguous, and undefined. Without waiving such
objection, ETS admits that MERS is not the "owner" of
the Renshaw DOT. ETS qualifies its admission by stating
that MERS is the beneficiary holding legal title to interests
granted by Plaintiff for the Deed of Trust, as nominee for
the lender.
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 23: Admit that no
sale, transfer or assignment of Renshaw's DOT has
been recorded in Ada County, Idaho.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 23:
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy ETS. This
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites
verbatim the factual allegations and/or' legal contentions
of Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended
Complaint. ETS has filed an Answer that fairly admits,
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such
objection, ETS asserts that it has made reasonable inquiry,
and to the extent the information is known or readily
obtainable, admits this request.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 25: Admit that
Renshaw on October 15, 20 I 0 has, by a qualified
written request, requested that the current holder of
the Renshaw Promissory Note and the current holder
of the Renshaw DOT be identified and that the
scheduled foreclosure sale be cancelled. Sec, Exhibit
12 to Plaintiffs' Pirst Amended Complaint.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 25:
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy ETS. This
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended
Complaint. ETS has filed an Answer that fairly admits,
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such
objection, ETS admits this request.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 32: Admit that
you are not the holder of the Renshaw Promissory
Note.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 32:
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it is vague,
ambiguous, and undefined as to the meaning of the term
"holder." Without waiving these objections, ETS admits
this request.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 33: Admit that
you are not in possession of the Renshaw Deed of
Trust.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST roR ADMISSION NO. 33:
Admit.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 34: Admit that
only the holder of the Renshaw Promissory Note and
the Renshaw DOT or other authorized person or entity
may foreclose the Renshaw DOT.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 34:
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it is
overbroad and vague, in part, because the terms "holder"
and "authorized person or entity" are undefined, ETS also
objects because it requests admission of a pure legal
conclusion. Without waiving such objections, ETS admits
only that authorized persons or entities may foreclose the
Renshaw DOT.
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 37: Admit that
you have no financial interest in the Renshaw
Promissory Note or Renshaw DOT.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 37:
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it is
compound and vague as to the term "financial interest."
Without waiving such objection, ETS admits this request.

----------·-·--·------·- ·--- -·
"'
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 38: Admit that
you have suffered no financial loss as a result of
non payment of the Renshaw Promissory Note.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 38:
Admit.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 39: Admit that
you do not represent and you are not the agent of the
current holder of the Renshaw Promissory Note.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 39:
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it is
undefined as to the meaning of the term "holder" and
requests admission of a pure conclusion of law. Without
waiving such objection, ETS admits this request. ETS is
the attorney-in-fact for the trustee under the deed of trust
securing payment of the Renshaw Promissory Note.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 40: Admit that
you do not represent and you are not the agent of the
current holder of the Renshaw DOT.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 40:
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it is
undefined as to the meaning of the term "holder" and
requests admission of a pure conclusion of law. Without
waiving such objection, ETS admits this request. ETS is
the attorney-in-fact for the trustee under the deed of trust
securing payment of the Renshaw Promissory Note.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 44:
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy ETS. This
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended
Complaint. ETS has filed an Answer that fairly admits,
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such
objection, ETS admits this request.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 44: Admit that
the Renshaw DOT names Pioneer Title Company of

Ada County as trustee.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 45: Admit that
you are not the trustee of the Renshaw DOT.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 45:
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy ETS. This
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended
Complaint. ETS has filed an Answer that fairly admits,
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
r~~ pons ~~i Ii ti cs_()f~_P_c1:1!La_12sw~i:l!1g_~_c;~~!1PJ.<lj_n_t_, as wel I
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as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such
objection, ETS admits that it is not the trustee of the
Renshaw DOT, but qualifies the admission by stating that
ETS does not purport to be the trustee of the Renshaw
DOT. ETS is the attorney-in-fact for Pioneer Lender
Trustee Services d/b/a Pioneer Title Company of Ada
County, the trustee of the Renshaw DOT.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 61: Admit that
you are not a party to the Renshaw Promissory Note
and Renshaw DOT.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 61:
Admit.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 62: Admit that

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 62:
Admit.

you knew of the Renshaw Promissory Note and

Renshaw DOT.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 67:
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it
constitutes an effo1t to harass and annoy ETS. This
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended
Complaint. ETS has filed an Answer that fairly admits,
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). ETS further objects to
this request on the grounds that it requests admission of a
pure conclusion of law. Without waiving such objections,
ETS admits this request.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 67: Admit that
Homecomings is not the beneficiary of the Renshaw

DOT.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 69:
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it is
compound and vague and constitutes an effort to harass
and annoy ETS. This Request for Admission, and nearly
every other Request for Admission in this set of discovery
requests, recites verbatim the factual allegations and/or
legal contentions of Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First
Amended Complaint. ETS has filed an Answer that fairly
admits, denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such
objection, ETS admits this request.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 69: Admit that
Homecomings has no interest in the Renshaw
Promissory Note or Renshaw DOT.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 71: Admit that
Homecomings does not hold possession of the
Renshaw Promissory Note .

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 71:
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it is
compound and vague and constitutes' an effort to harass

.___________________________________________a!!9_'.1~~ 1~.<?X§I§_:_I!~~--~~-q~~~~i<:>.!:_~9~_l1_i~s.i9_1~1-~~11_~'!~ly___
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every other Request for Admission in this set of discovery
requests, recites verbatim the factual allegations and/or
legal contentions of Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First
Amended Complaint. ETS has filed an Answer that fairly
admits, denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such
objection, ETS admits this request.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 79: Admit that

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 79:
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy ETS. This
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended
Complaint. ETS has filed an Answer that fairly admits,
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with
explanation in accordance with the requirements and
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such
objection, ETS asserts that it has made reasonable inquiry,
and to the extent the information is known or readily
obtainable, admits subparts (a), (b), and (c) (as attorneyin-fact for the trustee). With respect to subpatt (cl), ETS
denies.

you, MERS, and Homecomings stated the following

facts to Renshaw:
a.

That MERS is the beneficiary of the Deed of
Trust.

b. That MERS has the authority to foreclose on
Renshaw's property.
c.

That you have the authority to foreclose on
Renshaw's property.

d. That Homecomings has the authority to
foreclose on Renshaw's property.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 80: Admit that
such statements (see above Request for Admission
No. 79) are false.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 80:
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy ETS. This
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites
verbatim the factual and/or legal contentions of Renshaw
set forth in Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. ETS has
filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qualifies the
admission or denial with explanation in accordance with
the requirements and responsibilities of a party answering
a complaint, as well as the requirements of Rule J6(a).
Without waiving such objection, ETS asserts that it has
made reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the information
is known or readily obtainable, denies that those
statements in subparts (a), (b) and (c) are false. ETS
admits that the statement in subpart (cl) is presently false.
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